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Asymmetry of in/out-degree distribution is a widespread phenomenon in real-world complex net-
works. This paper put forward the concept of Edge Asymmetry(EA) to quantify this feature. We
designed an EA-based strategy to attack six kinds of real-world networks and found that it was able
to achieve the effect as well as edge betweenness-based(EB) and better than edge degree-based(ED)
and random attack strategies. In simulation, we found that the greater the network asymmetry the
better the EA-based attack strategy performed. By definition, the computational complexity of EA
was much lower than that of EB. Therefore, EA-based attack strategies were superior in efficiency.
We verified the effect of the EA-based attack strategy with four groups of large-scale networks.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 89.75.Fb, 89.75.Da
The robustness of a complex network indicates its abil-
ity to resist attacks. Many have studied the robustness
property by evaluating the network connectivity after re-
moving some nodes or edges [1][2][3]. We focus on the
influences of edge attack strategies. Strategies based
on random, degree and betweenness have been studied
by attacking various complex network models and real-
world networks [4][5][6]. There are, however, two prob-
lems. First, the random and ED strategies are fast but
their effects are relatively poor. Second, the EB strat-
egy achieves relatively better attack effect, but it is high
in computational complexity and not applicable to large-
scale networks. In this paper, we analyze the network
structures and propose a novel attack strategy with bet-
ter effect and high efficiency.
A B
< a, b >
Fig. 1: A typical asymmetric network structures. Node a’s
in-degree is larger than its out-degree. In Node b, it is the
opposite.
The distribution of out-degree differ greatly from that
of in-degree in many real-world networks, such as indus-
trial networks [7], social networks [8], WWW [9] and soft-
ware networks [10, 11]. In an asymmetric network, such
as one shown in Figure 1, we observed intuitively that
removing the edge of < a, b > would cause greater dam-
age to the network structure than removing one of the
other edges. Inspired by this observation, we proposed
measuring the asymmetry of an edge with Edge Asym-
metry(EA). EA and the nodes connected to the edge
were closely related, so we first defined Node Asymmetry
(NA).
NAina =
kina
Da
(1)
NAouta =
kouta
Da
(2)
Here kain and k
a
out are the in-degree and out-degree of
Node a, Da is the degree of Node a.
As shown in Figure 1, EA of the edge < a, b > can
be divided into in-degree EAin and out-degree EAout
according to node’s in-degree and out-degree.
EAinab = NA
in
a −NA
in
b (3)
EAoutba = NA
out
b −NA
out
a (4)
Noted that in-degree EAin and out-degree EAout have
the same significance mathematically.
EAinab = NA
in
a −NA
in
b
=
kina
Da
−
kinb
Db
=
kina Db − k
in
b Da
DaDb
(5)
EAoutba = NA
out
b −NA
out
a
=
koutb
Db
−
kouta
Da
=
koutb Da − k
out
a Db
DaDb
=
(Db − k
in
b )Da − (Da − k
in
a )Db
DaDb
=
DaDb − k
in
b Da −DaDb + k
in
a Db
DaDb
=
kina Db − k
in
b Da
DaDb
(6)
2As the in-degree EAin and out-degree EAout of the
edge< a, b > in Figure 1 have the same value, we selected
in-degree EAin to represent EA.
Complex networks exhibit different levels of robustness
under the various attacks [1][2]. The concept of network
asymmetry inspired us to try to attack by EA. We com-
pare it with three other strategies with same dataset.
The details of these strategies are described as follows.
(a) Edge Asymmetry (EA): Edge asymmetry reflects
the significance of edge in the network connectivity. The
edge with the largest asymmetry will be deleted in each
attack.
(b) Edge Degree (ED): Degree is a critical attribute
of a node [12]. The degree-based attack strategy is the
most widely-used attack method. It is proposed by Ref.
[4] where the edge degree is defined by Eq.(7).
keed = k
v
d × k
w
d (7)
where the edge e connects node v and w, keed denotes
the ED of edge e, and kvd and k
w
d represent the degree of
the node v and w, respectively. The strategy selects the
edges in descending degrees.
(b) Edge Betweenness (EB): Edge betweenness of the
edge < a, b > in the graph G=< V,E > is defined as:
Bab =
∑g
n
∑k
n
L(g,k,eab))
L(g,k))
n(n− 1))/2
(8)
In Eq.(8), L(g,k) represents the number of shortest
paths between node g and k, L(g, k, eab) represents the
number of paths passing edge eab, and n is the total
number of nodes in the graph. In most real-world large-
scale networks, the importance of each edge is different.
The betweenness centrality of an edge is its general static
characteristic quantity, reflecting the status and influence
of the edge in the whole network [13]. In this strategy,
the edge with the largest betweenness will be deleted in
each attack.
(d) Random Attack (RA): Random attack takes no
account of edge attributes, and deletes the randomly se-
lected edge in each attack.
We quantified the robustness of large networks by
studying how well these networks stay connected under
edge-removal attacks. Generally, the scale of strongly
connected subgraph, weakly connected subgraph and
spanning tree [19] are used to evaluate the robustness of
networks. For directed graphs, we found that we could
better measure the attack effect using the largest span-
ning tree.
When removing a few edges to change the network
structure, the largest weakly connected subgraph is very
likely to remain unchanged because that weakly con-
nected graph is nondirectional. Since strongly connected
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Fig. 2: An Example of Network Attack. As shown in Figure
2(a), before the attack, the largest weakly connected subgraph
and the largest spanning tree each consists of five nodes, and
the largest strongly connected subgraph has one node. After
removing the edge < 1, 2 > , as shown in Figure 2(b), the
largest weakly connected subgraph in the network still holds
five nodes, the largest strongly connected subgraph still has
one node, but the largest spanning tree has four nodes.
sub-graph can only include a small portion of the nodes
in the directed graph because its edges are directional, it
cannot represent the connectivity of the whole network.
The largest spanning tree, however, is sensitive to the
decrease of the edges in a network. Figure 2 shows an
example where compared with the largest strongly con-
nected subgraph and the largest weakly connected sub-
graph, the largest spanning tree can better reflect the
change of the directed network’s structure. Therefore,
we chose the scale of the largest spanning tree to mea-
sure the attack effect.
We use Si to represent the number of nodes in the
maximum spanning tree after i ’th edge-removal attack,
and S0 denotes the number of nodes in the maximum
spanning tree in the initial network. Then the ratio to
quantify the robustness of networks, S, can be defined
using Eq. (9):
S =
Si
S0
(9)
When the same number of edges are removed from the
network, the smaller the value of S, the more vulnerable
the network becomes, and the more efficient is the attack
strategy.
Except random attack strategy, for each of attack
strategies based on edge degree, edge betweenness and
edge asymmetry, we first sorted the edges according to
the edge attributes from the greatest to the smallest in
the initial network. Next we deleted the top 2% of the
sorted edges for each round of attack. After the i ’th
attack, we calculated the scale of the largest spanning
tree Si in the network and compared Si with the largest
spanning tree S0 in the initial network to derive Si/S0.
Figure 3 showed the result of using four attack strate-
gies to attack some real data sets. We could see that at-
tack strategies based on EA and EB were more efficient
for all data sets. EA attacks on networks such as Linux,
cit-Hepth, polblogs and celegansneural seemed more ef-
fective than those using the EB strategy. Initially, EA
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Fig. 3: Results of real network attack experiment. The abscissa f represents the percentage of the removed edges in the
networks, and the ordinate S the attack effect. The data sets are Linux l.2.0 function call graph[11] with 3992 nodes and 14954
edges, cit-Hepth[14] with 34,546 nodes and 421,578 edges, LittleRockLake[15] with 183 nodes and 2494 edges, polblogs[16] with
297 nodes and 2345 edges, celegansneural[17] with 1224 nodes and 19025 edges and macaque[18] with 45 nodes and 463 edges.
strategy in LittleRockLake network seemed inferior to
EB, but it quickly led to the collapse of the whole net-
work. As for macaque, the EA strategy seemed inferior
to the EB strategy. macaque has only 45 nodes, however,
and the attack effects of EA and EB strategies were hard
to distinguish. Figure 3 also showed that the ED and RA
strategies were less efficient on all data sets.
Next, we used some network examples to analyze the
results of the four attack strategies to explain why the
EA strategy was more effective.
The largest spanning tree of Figure 4(b) has 6 nodes,
and that of Figure 4(c) has only 4. This indicates that
the EA is superior to the EB attack strategy in this case.
Edge with the highest betweenness is the target of each
edge betweenness-based attack strategy. For a network
formed by starting and diverging from a few nodes, the
edge with the highest betweenness is generally the initial
ones. The effect of removing this edge on the network
structure is very small. Therefore, we think that the
EB attack strategy assigns too much importance to the
significance of the edges, and neglected its role in network
connectivity. The EA attack strategy can better identify
the edge most important to network connectivity.
The largest spanning tree of Figure 5(b) has 6 nodes,
and that of 5(c) has only 4. This indicates that EA at-
tack strategy is superior to the ED attack strategy. As
for directed graph, merely considering degree can fail to
correctly measure the importance of an edge in network
connectivity. For example, the edge < 2, 4 > in Fig-
ure 5(a) has the largest degrees, but there are relatively
more edges between node 2 and 4 to keep them connect.
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Fig. 4: Comparison of the EA and EB attack strategies. (a)
shows the original network. (b) shows the network structure
after removing the edge of the largest edge betweenness, <
1, 2 >. (c) shows the network structure after the removal of
the edge of the largest EA < 2, 3 >.
Therefore, removing such edges from the network will not
cause great impact on network connectivity. EA is bet-
ter able to recognize such edges and will not mistakenly
attack them.
Figure 3 showed that the EA attack strategy was ef-
fective on real-world networks, which preliminarily con-
firmed our speculation, i.e., network asymmetry had a
non-ignorable influence on network vulnerability. Next,
we set out to verify whether the effect of network at-
tack was better when the asymmetry is higher. We de-
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Fig. 5: Comparison of the EA and ED attack strategies. (a)
shows the original network. (b) shows the network structure
after removing the edge < 2, 4 > of the largest degree. (c)
shows the network structure after removing the edge < 2, 3 >
of the largest EA.
signed a graph generation algorithm, which controlled
the asymmetry of generated graph, and then attacked
the networks of different asymmetry using the EA strat-
egy. We used the random graph generation algorithm in
Ref. [20]. Additionally, we adjusted the network asym-
metry by controlling the relative size of out-degree and
in-degree ranges of nodes. The graph generation algo-
rithm is described as follows:
1. Create an empty in-degree queue din and an empty
out-degree dout.
2. Randomly select a number ini from the in-degree
range [inmin, inmax] as the in-degree of the i ’th
node and add it to din. Repeat until certain num-
ber of nodes are added (we set the number to
around 800).
3. Randomly select a number outi from the out-degree
range [outmin, outmax] as the out-degree of the i ’th
node and add it to dout. Repeat until the sum of
dout is equal to that of din.
4. Transform din and dout into the representation of
nodes. For example, transforming din [2,3,4,2] into
nin [0,0,1,1,1,2,2,2,2,3,3] means that No. 0 node
has two in-degrees, No. 1 node has three in-degrees
and No. 3 node has two in-degrees. Transforming
dout [1,3,2,5] into nout [0,1,1,1,2,2,3,3,3,3,3] means
that No. 0 node has one out-degree, No. 1 node has
three out-degrees, No. 2 node has two out-degrees
and No. 3 node has five out-degrees. In this case,
node queues nin and nout are derived. In the end,
their orders are randomized.
5. Perform pop operation on nin and nout queues.
Each round derives two nodes a and b, and create
the edge < a, b > thereby. Repeat such operation
until the nin and nout queues are empty. At this
point, the simulation is completed.
In the above-mentioned algorithm, we add a parameter
α to control the relative sizes of out-degree range and
in-degree range so that inmin = α × outmin, inmax =
α×outmax. When α increases from the initial value of 1,
the in-degree range of network node will become larger
than the out-degree range. The asymmetry of generation
graph is adjusted accordingly. Figure 6 shows that, as
the coefficient α increases, EA attack strategy achieves
better results as asymmetry of the same scale networks
becomes more prominent.
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Fig. 6: Results of EA attack strategy in the generated net-
works with increasingly asymmetry. We obtained 10 random
graphs each with about 800 nodes and 16,000 edges. The
asymmetry of graphs grew as we increased α by a step of 0.2
from 1.0 to 2.8. The X axis is the percentage of the removed
edges in the networks. The Y axis represents the attack effect.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
S
f
EA
ED
RA
(a)email-euall
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
S
f
EA
ED
RA
(b)web-berkstan
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
S
f
EA
ED
RA
(c)amazon0601
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
S
f
EA
ED
RA
(d)wikitalk
Fig. 7: Results of attacks on large data sets. The data sets
were Email-Euall[21] with 265,214 nodes and 420,045 edges,
web-BerkStan[22] with 685,230 nodes and 7,600,595 edges,
amazon0601[23] with 403,394 nodes and 3,387,388 edges, and
Wiki-Talk[24] with 2,394,385 nodes and 5,021,410 edges. The
X axis is the percentage of the removed edges in the networks,
and the Y axis represents the attack effect.
5In computational complexity, the EA attack strategy
has a great advantage compared with the EB attack
strategy. Computing edge betweenness is a critical step
in the analysis of complex network, but its cost is very
high. Generally, for the network with n nodes, space
complexity of computing edge betweenness is O(n2) , and
time complexity is O(n3). We adopted the algorithm in
Ref. [25] to compute edge betweenness. For a graph
with n nodes and m edge, the space complexities of both
weighted graph and unweighted graph are O(m+n), the
time complexity of weighted graph is O(mn + n2logn),
and the time complexity of unweighted graph is O(mn).
In contrast, EA of each edge can be derived through the
degree of nodes on both sides of the edge. Therefore
EA can be obtained by traversing the edges. The time
complexity of computing EA is O(n) and the space com-
plexity is O(m) for a graph with n nodes and m edges.
Thus, when attack effects are similar, the EA attack
strategy is superior to the EB attack strategy in terms
of computing cost. We selected four groups of large-scale
data sets, including Email-Euall[21], web-BerkStan[22],
amazon0601[23] and Wiki-Talk[24], to conduct attack ex-
periments. Because the amount of computation of edge
betweenness-based attack strategy was too large, we only
performed the other three attack strategies, i.e. EA, ED
and RA strategies.
Figure 7 shows the results of attacks on large data
sets. The EA attack strategy performed far better than
the ED and RA attack strategies. The experiment setup
consisted of Ubuntu14.04 32-bit system, GCC 4.8.4, and
i7 processor with 2GB memory and 3.4GHz quad-core.
The EA attack strategy took no more than 190 seconds
to compute the largest-scale wiki-Talk data sets.
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